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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Panel 14 – Major Programs: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly 
 
Thursday, May 12, 2011 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. 
Chair: Vice Admiral W. Mark Skinner, USN, Principal Military Deputy, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, & Acquisition) 
An Assessment of the DoD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs 
Michael Sullivan, GAO 
Cost and Time Overruns for Major Defense Acquisition Programs: An 
Annotated Brief 
David Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Joachim Hofbauer, Gregory Sanders, 
Jesse Ellman, and David Morrow, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies 
Straight Talk: Major Program Manager Views of Defense Acquisition 
Roy Wood and Al Moseley, DAU 
Vice Admiral W. Mark Skinner—Principal Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
(Research, Development & Acquisition). Vice Admiral Skinner assumed his duties August 9, 2010. 
Skinner was born in Houston, Texas and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in June 
1977. 
As a flag officer, he was the program executive officer for Tactical Aircraft Programs and commanded 
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, and served as assistant commander, Test and 
Evaluation, Naval Air Systems Command. Skinner held both operational and shore commands, to 
include commanding officer Patrol Squadron 47, chief test pilot and commanding officer of Naval 
Force Aircraft Test Squadron, and program manager for a chief of naval operations special project.  
He is a graduate of the Navy Test Pilot School and served in Force Warfare Aircraft Test Directorate, 
where he was recognized as Directorate Test Pilot of the Year in 1986. Additionally, he received a 
degree in Financial Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, where he graduated as a 
Conrad Scholar and was awarded the Department of Navy award for excellence in financial 
management and the Rear Admiral Thomas R. McClellan award for excellence in administrative 
sciences. 
His awards include Legion of Merit (3 awards), Meritorious Service Medal (4 awards), Navy 
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Straight Talk: Major Program Manager Views of Defense 
Acquisition 
Roy Wood—Dean, Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition University.  A 
retired Navy Engineering Duty Officer, Dr. Wood has experience in shipboard combat systems 
remote sensing, high energy lasers, and missile defense.  He holds a BS degree in computer science 
from Texas A&M University, master’s degrees in engineering and business, and a PhD in 
organization and management.  His dissertation dealt with program manager competencies. 
[roy.wood@dau.mil] 
Al Moseley—Professor, Program Management, Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA. An 
Air Force veteran, Dr. Moseley has over 26 years of experience in leadership and program 
management positions in the acquisition of military systems to include space, communication, 
command and control, and air traffic systems. He holds a BS degree in electrical engineering from 
Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, AL, an MS degree in electrical engineering from the Air Force 
Institute of Technology, Dayton, OH, and a Doctor of Strategic Leadership degree from Regent 
University, Virginia Beach, VA. [Alphronzo.moseley@dau.mil] 
Abstract 
Current efforts by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) to 
improve acquisition outcomes are focused on addressing perceived problems that 
create inefficiencies in major programs.  Program Manager (PM) Forums were 
established by senior acquisition leaders within OSD to hear directly from a sampling 
of major PMs to help key OSD leaders understand PM perspectives and issues.  
This study analyzes the results from six PM Forums attended by 148 major PMs 
between November 2007 and November 2010, and it provides a synthesis and 
presentation of current programmatic issues and trends. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) plans to spend about $189 billion for its 
acquisition programs in fiscal year 2011 and increase its investment in procurement during 
that period by nearly 8%, from $105 billion to $113 billion (Congressional Research Service, 
2010). Although the DoD’s submarines, destroyers, combat ships, carriers, fighter aircraft, 
missiles, and helicopters are widely regarded as unrivaled in superiority, for decades, many 
of the DoD’s weapon systems acquisitions have experienced—and continue to 
experience—schedule delays and cost overruns (GAO, 2006). These overruns not only cost 
taxpayers, but they have also undermined the warfighting capabilities of U.S. military forces. 
The individuals responsible and accountable for the health of weapon systems acquisitions 
are the program managers. 
The nation depends on program managers to be able to effectively and efficiently run 
major, complex weapon systems acquisitions. Yet, today’s program managers face 
unprecedented challenges. Wartime threats are asymmetrical and evolve quickly.  Weapon 
systems are increasingly sophisticated, networked, and interdependent.  Development 
cycles that need to be faster are often slowed by legitimate changes in warfighting 
requirements, extensive oversight, and ever more complicated laws, regulations, and 
business practices. 
In November 2007, OSD acquisition leaders established PM Forums to help them 
better understand the most pressing issues PMs believe they are facing.  Since then, there 
have been six PM Forums, attended by a total of 148 major program managers. This paper 
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analyzes the results of those six PM Forums and provides a synthesis and presentation of 
programmatic issues and trends as viewed by the program managers at the tip of the 
execution spear. 
Literature Review 
The Role of the Program Manager 
A program manager (PM) is the “designated individual with responsibility for and 
authority to accomplish program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to 
meet the user’s operational needs” (DAU, 2009, p. 15). Accountable to the DoD’s Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA), the specific role of the PM is as follows: 
To direct the development, production, and initial deployment (as a minimum) of 
a new defense system. This must be done within limits of cost, schedule, and 
performance, as approved by the PM’s acquisition executive. The PM’s role, 
then, is to be the agent of the military service or Defense agency in the defense 
acquisition system to ensure the warfighter’s modernization requirements are 
met efficiently and effectively in the shortest possible time. (DAU, 2009, p. 15) 
For management purposes, all defense acquisition systems fall into one of three 
Acquisition Categories, or ACAT levels: 
 Acquisition Category I, or Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP): a 
program with a designated value of more than $365 million in research, 
development, test, and evaluation expenditures or more than $2.19 billion in 
procurement expenditures. 
 Acquisition Category II: a program with a designated value of more than $140 
million in research, development, test, and evaluation expenditures or more 
than $660 million in procurement expenditures. 
 Acquisition Category III: a program that does not meet either Acquisition 
Category I or II criteria. (DAU, 2009, p. 20) 
DoD policy requires that a PM be designated for each acquisition program. The PM 
for the most complex ACAT I programs are typically military officers at the grade of O-6 or 
senior civilians at the GS-15 level.  In 2009, there were 102 Acquisition Category I programs 
in the unclassified domain (Carter, 2009). ACAT I PMs are confronted with the dynamic 
challenge to deliver the most complex and expensive systems on time and under budget 
with superior warfighting performance. 
Challenges in Defense Acquisition 
In 1985, the Packard Commission was charged by President Ronald Reagan to 
conduct a comprehensive defense management study of the budgeting process, 
procurement system, legislative oversight, and organizational and operational arrangements 
among Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), the Military Departments, and the regional commanders (A Formula for Action, 1986). 
The commission report concluded that there were fundamental and systemic problems 
within the defense acquisition system creating major undesired consequences. It reported 
the following: 
These problems are deeply entrenched and have developed over several 
decades from an increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process. As a 
result, all too many of our weapon systems cost too much, take too long to 
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develop, and, by the time they are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology. (A 
Formula for Action, 1986, p. 5) 
Given the complicated management environment involving many stakeholders as 
well as internal and external pressures on the DoD, the commission report also concluded 
that PMs spent the majority of their time briefing and reporting on their programs, rather than 
managing them. The report stated, 
In effect, [the PM] is reduced to being a supplicant for, rather than a manager of, 
his program. The resulting huckster psychology does not condition the program 
manager to search for possible inconsistencies between performance and 
schedule, on the one hand, and authorized funding, on the other. Predictably, 
there is a high incidence of cost overruns on major weapon systems programs. 
(A Formula for Action, 1986, p. 5) 
Twenty-five years later, with few systemic improvements to the underlying system, 
PMs are still faced with the dual challenges of managing both an extremely complex 
program and a bloated and bureaucratic acquisition system in search of the sweet spot 
among performance, schedule, and authorized funding. Some of the obstacles identified by 
the Packard Commission were reiterated in a later study: the 2006 Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment, or DAPA study. These include the following: 
Unstable Acquisition System 
A major PM challenge is operating in an unstable acquisition system. The 2006 
DAPA report refers to this as government-induced instability. It is a cycle unto itself: 
unpredictable program cost, schedule, and performance beget leadership that loses 
confidence in the acquisition system, which begets more intervention and oversight, which 
begets adjustments in budget and schedule requirements. This cycle can begin with 
requirements developers who specify system performance that is well beyond what the 
technological state-of-the-art can deliver in the needed timeframe.  Acquisition teams can 
also create undisciplined and escalating derived requirements, which in turn drive costs 
beyond the program’s baseline. Comptrollers are often asked to “fix” a broken portfolio of 
programs, unilaterally adjusting program budgets and creating additional “churn” in planning 
and execution. These behaviors significantly add cost and lengthen development and 
production cycles (Kadish, 2006). 
Requirements and Resources Gaps 
Another major PM challenge is gaps between requirements and resources that are 
often not closed before or during program development. It is no secret that the DoD starts 
more acquisition programs than it can ultimately afford, creating an environment in which 
PMs must continually compete for funding. Winners proceed on plan, but losers must 
restructure their programs on the fly to continue to execute within the reduced funding.  
Stretching program schedules, reducing numbers or capabilities of systems, or reducing 
testing are all favorite ways to do this but have serious downstream impacts to costs, 
deliveries, and capabilities.  It should also come as no surprise that DoD programs often 
proceed past milestones with immature technologies.  Perverse incentives exist in the 
system to reward a program that proceeds without really knowing whether its technologies 
will work as intended.  Once programs are started and have the initial commitment of 
funding, stakeholder advocates will continue to support the programs because their 
continuation benefits communities, constituents, and contractors (GAO, 2005). 
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Little Control Over Funding 
Another major PM challenge is little control over funding. In other words, PMs cannot 
count on stable funding. When funding cuts happen, and they often do, PMs spend hours 
addressing funding-related problems to their senior acquisition leaders regarding impacts 
from these cuts that often translate to commitment challenges to contractors (GAO, 2005). 
Part of the problem is that in reality and practice, the budget, requirements, and acquisition 
system operate independently of each other rather than being efficiently integrated. In 
simplistic terms, the values of each are often misaligned with each other, as noted in the 
following: 
 The…acquisition process values how to buy, striving to balance cost, 
schedule, and performance. 
 The requirements process values the why and what to buy, focusing on 
obtaining the ability to achieve mission success at the lowest cost in lives. 
 The budget process values how much and when to buy and focuses on 
control and oversight to balance the instability that advocacy creates. 
(Kadish, 2006, p. 4) 
Indeed, many acquisition reform studies and initiatives have occurred alongside the 
Packard Commission and DAPA studies to address these and other acquisition issues. 
More Acquisition Reform 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 was passed by the 
111th Congress on May 22, 2009. It made several changes to the acquisition process for 
acquiring Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information 
Systems (MAIS). Key provisions of the law include appointments of a Director of Systems 
Engineering, a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and a Director 
of Developmental Test and Evaluation. It gave combatant commanders more influence in 
the requirements process, made changes to the Nunn–McCurdy Act pertaining to critical 
cost growth, and revised DoD conflict-of-interests guidelines for MDAP contractors (Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 2009).  
An even more recent congressional acquisition reform initiative is the Implementing 
Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every (IMPROVE) 
Acquisition Act of 2010. While WSARA aimed to reform weapons system acquisitions, the 
IMPROVE bill’s primary emphasis is on adding value in the acquisition of services and 
information technology programs. The act focuses on four specific areas: the defense 
acquisition system, the defense acquisition workforce, financial management, and the 
industrial base (Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain 
Value in Every Acquisition [IMPROVE] Act, 2010). 
Given the intense scrutiny and extensive acquisition reform initiatives over the years, 
why are there still problems and challenges for major PMs today?  This study of PM Forums 
sought to hear directly from a sampling of major PMs and thereby gain a better 
understanding of the PMs’ perspectives on the issues they face every day. A description of 
the methodology of this study follows. 
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The target of this study was a group of invited PMs of ACAT I and II programs who 
attended the PM Forums from November 2007 to November 2010.  This exclusive group of 
148 senior (most were O-6 or GS-15 equivalent) program managers represented significant 
acquisition experience and provided a glimpse into their lived experiences on the front lines 
of the acquisition process. 
PM Forum History 
In February 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology (DUSD[A&T]) initiated the idea of a forum in collaboration with ACAT I PMs 
attending the executive PM course at the DAU. A central tenet of the forum would be 
“straight talk” directly from major PMs without the filters of Program Executive Officers and 
Service Acquisition Executives.  This would allow PMs to convey, in a non-attribution 
environment, their unvarnished opinions of what was going well—and not so well—in the 
acquisition process and to seek OSD guidance and even resolution on tough programmatic 
issues. 
In a memo dated September 26, 2007, the USD(AT&L) created the first PM Forum to 
be held in conjunction with the annual Program Executive Officer/Systems Command 
Commander’s Conference in November 2007. Subsequent two-day forums have been held 
semi-annually, sponsored by the USD(AT&L) and hosted by the DAU at Fort Belvoir, VA. 
Data Collection 
Data have been collected from 148 PMs who attended the six PM Forums from 
November 2007 to November 2010. These PMs represented 12 defense acquisition 
agencies (see Table 1). 




Nov 2007 Apr 2008 Nov 2008 May 2009 Nov 2009 Nov 2010 
BTA 1 2 0 2 0 0 
DISA 3 4 3 3 1 2 
DLA 0 0 2 0 0 0 
MDA 2 3 2 2 1 0 
NGA 1 1 0 1 1 1 
NSA 0 1 0 0 2 1 
USAF 8 6 3 5 4 3 
USA 9 3 7 3 4 6 
USN 5 4 5 4 5 6 
USMC 1 1 1 1 1 2 
USSOCOM 2 0 3 1 1 0 
USTRANSCOM 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Total 32 25 28 22 20 21 
Services and agencies nominated approximately 30 major PMs to attend each 
forum.  PMs were asked to be prepared to discuss their top three programmatic issues. The 
group is kept to a manageable number so that PMs can shape the forum dialogue with OSD 
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senior acquisition leaders.  Forum rules value open, two-way communication and interactive 
discussions with a focus toward action-oriented outcomes. 
Formulation of major PM issues was facilitated using a proven software tool called 
ThinkTank by GroupSystems. ThinkTank is a team collaboration tool used for innovation, 
decision-making, and leadership to enhance the performance of leaders in business, 
government, and professional services. Besides the DoD, the tool has been used by NASA, 
IBM, Proctor and Gamble, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and many others (GroupSystems, 
2010). Utilizing a trained DAU facilitator, the software tool focuses on extracting the PMs’ top 
programmatic issues through the process defined in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Formulation of Program Manager Top Issues and Proposed Solutions 
(Moseley, 2010) 
During the sessions, the PMs enter their top three programmatic issues into 
ThinkTank and then brainstorm their entries into a set of common themes that emerge from 
the team discussions. 
After the themes had been agreed upon, the PMs are divided into small teams. Each 
team selects a theme and a team leader, then builds a list of recommended solutions to the 
problems that have been identified within their theme. They create a presentation and 
present their findings to the larger group and the OSD officials. Each team’s presentations 
include supporting issues, the actors required to assist in resolving the issues, the timeline 
for issue resolution, and the team’s proposed solution set. During each presentation, the 
PMs engage in “straight talk” with the OSD senior acquisition leaders, who have shown a 
keen interest in understanding the PMs’ perspectives and then have committed to actions 
based on the PM recommendations. 
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Results and Discussion 
PM Straight Talk 
Table 2 reports the summary of the major themes from the six PM Forums. 
Table 2. Summary of Major Themes From Six PM Forums 
(Moseley, 2010) 
8 Nov 2007 
32 PMs  
3 Apr 2008 
25 PMs  
6 Nov 2008 
28 PMs  
28 May 2009 
22 PMs 
5 Nov 2009 
20 PMs  
4 Nov 2010 
21 PMs 
OSD Policy & 
Staff 
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Industry Requirements     
PMs captured major issues within each theme as supporting issues. For the 
supporting issues, PMs identified key stakeholders/actors that should help address or 
resolve the issues, and a set of proposed solutions for each issue. Since the supporting 
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issues derived from the major themes were too numerous to report in this paper, only a 
sampling of the major themes, subsequent supporting issues, and proposed solutions from 
only one of the many themes for each forum are presented. 
PM Forum #1. Thirty-two PMs attended the November 2007 forum and reported the 
following major themes: 
 Program Management Resources,  
 OSD Policy and Staff, 
 Requirements,  
 Resources—Personnel, 
 Lack of End-To-End System of Systems Engineering Process, 
 Testing, and 
 Industry. 
Of the seven major themes, supporting issues and proposed solutions are provided 
for the major theme Program Management Resources. PMs were adamant that funding 
instability was affecting baseline management; there were “unfunded mandates” consisting 
of Unique Identification, Information Assurance, Net-Ready Key Performance Parameters, 
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module/Global Air Traffic Management, and Mode 5/S 
Compliance; supplemental funding was driving the PMs to a higher ACAT oversight; and 
there was a lack of Service commitment for Joint programs. Table 3 shows the PMs’ 
supporting issues and proposed solutions for major theme Program Management 
Resources. 
Table 3. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for Program 
Management Resources 
(Moseley, 2010) 
Supporting Issues Proposed Solutions 
Funding Instability 
Affecting Baseline 
 Permit multi-year procurement authority 
 Support for baseline adjustments caused by external stakeholders 
 Permit capital funding 
Unfunded Mandates  Any policy issued must have funding to implement 
 Communicate required funding impact review with Services  
Supplemental Funding  Industrial Base is not always able to execute the funding 
 Waive ACAT I program documentation and requirements for 
ACAT II programs 
Joint Program Lack of 
Service Commitment 
 Properly adjust Service TOA when Agency program is transitioned 
after development. E.g., DARPA projects transitioned to Joint 
Agency or Service adversely effects TOA   
PMs proposed eight solutions. For example, to address the issues of funding 
instability affecting baselines and unfunded mandates, PMs advocated for multi-year 
procurement authority, the support for baseline adjustments caused by external 
stakeholders, the permission for capital funding, funding support for any policies issued, and 
the need to communicate funding impacts through reviews with the Services. 
PM Forum #2. The following major themes were documented by 25 PMs who attended the 
April 2008 forum: 
 Funding Instability; 
 People, Staffing, and Skills; 
 Speed of Acquisition; 
 Integration, Interoperability, & Interdependency; 
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 Industrial Base; 
 Oversight/Governance; and 
 Requirements. 
The major theme Funding Instability was selected to provide the supporting issues 
and proposed solutions. In this forum, PMs pointed out that funding cuts were forced and 
unpredictable, that there was a lack of flexibility to plan a resilient program, that the DoD did 
not use the most probable cost for program baselines, and the DoD subscribed to a current-
year focus rather than an overall life cycle cost focus. Table 4 shows the PMs’ supporting 
issues and proposed solutions derived from the major theme Funding Instability.  
Table 4. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for Funding Instability 
(Moseley, 2010) 




 First answer should be no - second answer should be yes only with 
data driven/risk based APB/EMA revisions—this should be 
implemented by Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) 
 Require fully funded increments—this should be an OSD policy 
that is implemented by the CAE  
Lack of Flexibility to 
Plan Resilient 
Program 
 OSD & CAEs should advocate for the Economic Order Quantity 
policy to Congress (lot size, multi-year, value based)  
Not Using Most 
Probable Cost for 
Program Baseline  
 Budget to 80% confidence level (Policy OSD, Industry/C/S 
Implementation) 
 Allow visible government management reserve—this should be an 
OSD policy implemented by Industry & CAEs 
Current-Year Focus 
verses Overall Life 
Cycle Cost Focus  
 Create ROI account or Weapons Capital Fund 
 Payback to the account the fund required  
 Share saving with the contractor, program office—this should be 
an OSD policy implemented by the CAEs  
PMs proposed eight solutions to resolve the supporting issues. For example, to 
resolve the issues of the lack of flexibility to plan a resilient program and the non-use of the 
most probable cost for the program baseline, PMs advocated for OSD and the Component 
Acquisition Executives to gain Congress’ approval for the establishment of an economic 
ordering quantity policy that would be value based and aimed at lot sizes and multi-year 
procurements. They also advocated for visible government management reserve that would 
be an OSD policy implemented by both Industry and the Component Acquisition Executives.  
PM Forum #3. The following major themes were documented by 28 PMs who attended the 
November 2008 forum: 
 Qualified/Experienced Acquisition Workforce, 
 Funding & Contracting, 
 Controlling Requirements, and 
 Inconsistent Policy & Oversight. 
The PMs argued that for the major theme Qualified/Experienced Acquisition 
Workforce, the supporting issues were recruiting, training, retention, experience, and lack of 
billets. The PMs’ supporting issues and proposed solutions are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for 
Qualified/Experienced Acquisition Workforce 
(Moseley, 2010) 
Supporting Issues Proposed Solutions 
Recruiting 
 
 Establish mentoring/intern programs 
 Pursue relationships with local/state colleges 
 Stream-line hiring timeline/process 
 Consider wounded warrior programs  
Training  
 
 Establish acquisition training for requirement officers 
 Institute refresher courses 
 Consider/review reducing length of DAU’s PMT401 course 
Retention  Provide the Services with compensation options 
 Establish focused incentives 
Experience 
 
 Manage resource officer rotations 
 Require defense sector PM experience for SAEs & staffs 
 Facilitate an “A Team” concept 
Lack of Billets  Review force structure requirements/balance 
To address or resolve the supporting issues, PMs proposed 13 solutions. For 
instance, in the areas of experience and lack of billets, PMs advocated for better 
management of resources as they apply to officer rotations, the requirement for defense 
sector PM experience for the Service Acquisition Executives and their staffs, the facilitation 
of an “A Team” concept, and the review of force structure requirements to ensure balance. 
PM Forum #4. Twenty-two PMs who attended the May 2009 forum presented the following 
major themes: 
 Policy, 
 IT Acquisition & Implementation,  
 Oversight & Excessive Documentation, 
 Staffing & Personnel, and 
 Requirements & Funding. 
During this forum, PMs insisted that acquisition policies were inconsistent, unclear 
and overly complex, and difficult to implement as it pertained to the major theme Policy. PMs 
proposed nine solutions to fix the supporting issues, as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for Policy 
(Moseley, 2010) 
Supporting Issues Proposed Solutions 
Policies are 
inconsistent 
 Establish process for policy change approval & implementation 
(e.g., change control, roles & responsibilities, interdependencies ) 
 Ensure timing of policy implementation is part of every policy 
change 
 Force rigor into policy change process by mandating use of metrics 
& historical analysis 
 Mandate establishment of supporting processes  
Policies are unclear 
& overly complex 
 Mandate agency level review of all candidate policy changes  
 Audit & baseline existing policy volume & complexity.  Moratorium 
on changes in interim 
 Establish best practices for determination of minimum 
documentation required for milestones 
Policies are difficult 
to implement 
 Mandate ADM/PMD dialogue between MDA & PM before final 
signature to eliminate surprise 
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For example, to address or resolve the issue of policies that are unclear and overly 
complex, the PMs advocated for an agency-level review of all candidate policy changes, for 
an audit and then baseline of existing policy volume and complexity, and for a moratorium 
on changes in the interim. They also wanted to see the establishment of best practices in 
the determination of minimum documentation required for milestones.  
PM Forum #5. The following major themes were presented by 20 PMs in the November 
2009 forum: 
 Requirements Instability, Growth & Inadequate Definition Drive Cost & 
Schedule Execution Issues; 
 Manpower Skills & Knowledge Shortage;  
 Funding Instability & Minimal Reprogramming Authority (Reduces PM 
Flexibility & Management Control & Causes Frequent Program Restructures); 
 Policy Unclear, Inconsistent, & Burdensome; 
 Focus of OSD Staff Misplaced; and 
 Issues with Contracting & Industrial Base. 
The PMs documented four supporting issues as essential to the major theme 
Requirements Instability, Growth & Inadequate Definition Drive Cost & Schedule Execution 
Issues: Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) levies excessive testing 
requirements; there are unfunded mandates such as anti-tamper; there are inadequate 
requirements definition and ability to perform adequate cost estimation prior to Milestone A 
(MS-A); and there is a lack of consistent requirements/program initiation process between 
the DoD and the Intelligence Community.  Table 7 shows the PMs’ supporting issues and 
proposed solutions for the major theme Requirements Instability, Growth & Inadequate 
Definition Drive Cost & Schedule Execution Issues.  
Table 7. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for Requirements 
Instability, Growth & Inadequate Definition Drive Cost & Schedule Execution Issues 
(Moseley, 2010) 
Supporting Issues Proposed Solutions 
DOT&E levies excessive testing 
requirements 
 Consolidate single authority for funding and 
requirements by VCJCS 
Unfunded mandates such as anti-
tamper 
 Implement adequate policy to ensure new requirements 
have associated funding in year of execution by 
USD/AT&L  
Inadequate requirements 
definition and ability to perform 
adequate cost estimation prior to 
MS-A 
 Implement improved disciplined process & 
accountability for affordable test execution by DOT&E 
Lack of consistent 
requirements/program initiation 
process between DoD & 
Intelligence Community 
 Establish improved, linked policy between JCIDS & 
acquisition processes to support earlier, adequate 
requirements definition by USD/AT&L & J8 
 
PMs proposed four solutions. For example, to address or resolve the issue of 
inadequate requirements definition and ability to perform adequate cost estimation prior to 
Milestone A, PMs advocated for the implementation of an improved disciplined process and 
accountability for affordable test execution by the Director of Operational Test & Evaluation.  
PM Forum #6. The following major themes were presented by 21 PMs in the November 
2010 forum: 
 Contracting: Process—Management—Procurement Timeline, 
 =
=




 IT & Software-Intensive Systems, 
 Funding Flexibility & Workforce Experience, and 
 Leadership Intent: Disconnected Implementation. 
The PMs derived the following supporting issues from the major theme Contracting: 
Process—Management—Procurement Timeline: the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) audit process is overly conservative and risk adverse; there is a double standard in 
the process (auditing takes the contractor 30–45 days but 6–18 months for the government); 
the contracting workforce is inexperienced; the contracting process exacerbates funds 
management issues; OSD & Services overlap as they pertain to process over product; and 
the certification to Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and  Truth in Negotiations Act 
(TINA) and certified cost and pricing data/Earned Value Management System (EVMS) 
actions are redundant and overly burdensome for lower value contracts. Table 8 shows the 
PMs’ supporting issues and proposed solutions for the major theme Contracting: Process—
Management—Procurement Timeline. 
Table 8. PMs’ Supporting Issues & Proposed Solutions for Contracting: 
Process—Management—Procurement Timeline 
(Moseley, 2010) 
Supporting Issues Proposed Solutions 
DCAA audit process overly 
conservative/risk adverse (double 
standard:  it takes contractors 30-45 
days & government 6-18 months) 
 Review DCAA audit processes to allow less than 
100% perfection in audits—look to raise audit 
thresholds (OSD/DPAP) 
Inexperienced contracting workforce   PCOs need to take PM training and vice versa—
case based vs. “how-to”/checklist 
Contracting process exacerbates funds 
management issues 
 PCOs & buyers need to partner with the 
PM/Technical team to ensure government is a 
smart buyer – PK team generally not experts in 
the domain (“too much independence” today) 
Process over Product: OSD & Services 
overlap 
 Ensure PCOs accountable to the PM while still 
fulfilling responsibilities (OPCON vs. ADCON) 
Certification to CICA (Competition In 
Contracting Act) & TINA (Truth In 
Negotiations Act) & certified cost & 
pricing data/Earned Value 
Management System (EVMS) actions 
are redundant and overly burdensome 
for lower value contracts 
 There is too much regulation: FARs, DFARs, 
AFFARs, AFFAR Sup, ARFARS, OSD Policy, 
Service Policy, Command Policies, & Functional 
Policy. Protests have made us risk averse; the 
workforce doesn’t have bandwidth and 
experience/judgment to tailor the process; and 
approval levels are too high & dollar thresholds 
are too low 
PMs proposed five solutions to overcome this major theme. For instance, to address 
or resolve the issues of an inexperienced contracting workforce and the PMs’ perspective 
that the contracting process exacerbates funds management issues, PMs advocated that 
PCOs take program management training and vice versa in a case-based learning 
environment. PMs also advocated that PCOs and buyers needed to partner with the 
program management and technical team to ensure that the government is a smart buyer, 
because the contracting team, in general, does not have expertise in the domain. This must 
be done to eliminate the independence seen today. 
The results presented in this paper represent data from 148 major PMs from 12 
defense acquisition agencies who attended six PM Forums held from November 2007 to 
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November 2010. Senior OSD acquisition leaders heard directly from these PMs in the form 
of “straight talk” as they articulated proposed solutions for a plethora of burning 
programmatic issues. Referring back to Table 2 and conducting a comparative analysis, 
several major themes kept repeating themselves across the forums. 
Trends 
After conducting a comparative analysis of the major themes during the six PM 
Forums, the themes that repeated themselves were program management resources, policy 
and oversight, requirements, acquisition workforce, the contracting process, the industrial 
base, IT acquisition, and testing (See Table 9). 
Table 9. Comparative Analysis of the Repetition of Major Themes in PM Forums 
(Moseley, 2010) 
PM Forums in Which Major Themes Were Repeated 
 




X X X X X X 
Policy/Oversight X X X X X X 
Requirements X X X X X X 
Acquisition 
Workforce 
X X X X X X 
Contracting Process   X  X X 
Industrial Base X X   X  
IT Acquisition    X  X 
Testing X     X 
However, the themes that were consistent over all six forums were as follows: 
program management resources, policy and oversight, requirements, and the acquisition 
workforce. The contracting process was a major issue in three forums: November 2008, 
November 2009, and November 2010. Likewise, the industrial base surfaced as a major 
issue in three forums: November 2007, April 2008, and November 2009. IT acquisition 
surfaced twice as a major issue in later forums: May 2009 and November 2010. Testing was 
more sporadic. It surfaced as a major issue only in the first and sixth PM Forum. It is 
interesting to note that in the November 2010 forum, the PMs captured all major themes 
from past forums with the exception of the industrial base. 
While there is no direct evidence that the PM Forum discussions led to changes in 
the acquisition system, it appears that the seeds for several major initiatives may have been 
planted with OSD during these events. In particular, major workforce improvement 
initiatives, including the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (10 USC 1705, 
2008), expedited hiring authority, and contractor insourcing may have a significant positive 
impact on the acquisition workforce issues raised by the PMs. Similarly, some PM 
requirements issues are being addressed through recent legislation mandating training of 
the requirements management workforce and establishment of Configuration Control 
Boards (CCBs) to help PMs control requirements creep. Finally, several recent USD(AT&L) 
efficiency initiatives are aimed at reducing the oversight burden and streamlining 
burdensome and expensive acquisition documentation (Carter, 2010). 
Despite all of the reforms in acquisition to make the process better, one continued 
drumbeat of PMs that remains unanswered since the first PM Forum in 2007 is the issue of 
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unpredictable funding. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
system, an arcane relic from the 1960s, is an inflexible, calendar-driven system that is rife 
with perverse incentives.  PMs are measured and rewarded on their obligation and 
expenditure of funds with little regard to how or why the taxpayers’ monies were spent. The 
fundamental mismatch between an event-driven program and the calendar-driven PPBE 
system often leaves the PM a Hobson’s choice of losing or reprogramming money to adjust 
the schedule for a program event, or pressing ahead in the face of a clear need to slow 
down (or speed up) to fix a program technical or schedule issue.  PPBE adjustments within 
one program often create ripple effects and churn in the wider program portfolio. “Colors of 
money” can have equally perplexing impacts. While a program may have an abundance of 
procurement dollars, for example, they may be short on research and development funds. 
Since the monies are not interchangeable, a crisis ensues, even though the PM has, in 
aggregate, sufficient funds for the program. To date, no one has offered a viable substitute 
for the PPBE system.  PMs continue to indicate that they spend substantial amounts of time 
managing workarounds. 
Conclusion 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) saw a need to improve acquisition 
outcomes by establishing PM Forums. These forums are venues where PMs can provide 
“straight talk” to OSD senior acquisition leaders. Six forums have been held since 2007 and 
attended by 148 major PMs from 12 defense acquisition agencies. Of the major issues and 
proposed solutions presented by PMs, issues in program management resources, policy 
and oversight, requirements, and the acquisition workforce still persist. Acquisition initiatives 
are ongoing and are attempting to address these tough, persistent issues. The effectiveness 
of these initiatives will undoubtedly continue to be evaluated by PMs in future forums. 
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